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Abstract 
Various scholars stress that traditional regulatory regimes will benefit from greater private-
sector involvement. There has been little empirical study, however, on the impact of the 
“amount” of privatization on certain policy goals. This paper aims at filling that knowledge gap. 
Based on an analysis of private-sector involvement in the enforcement of Australian and 
Canadian building codes, it argues that a certain threshold exists after which more privatization 
no longer results in effectiveness and efficiency gains. It furthermore identifies that the 
relationship between the public and private sector within a regime matters in reaching certain 
policy goals. 
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1 Introduction 
In their highly influential work Smart Regulation, Gunningham and Grabosky state that 
“recruiting a range of regulatory actors to implement complementary combinations of policy 
instruments (…) will produce more effective and efficient policy outcomes” (1998: 15). Although 
this proposition was stated over a decade ago, it is still of topical interest. Many governments 
around the world have sought or seek an increase in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
regulatory policy through non-governmental involvement. Literally acting upon Gunningham 
and Grabosky’s advice (1998: 449), private-sector actors are sought to take up regulatory 
enforcement tasks, with the expectation that they are the most capable of doing so. 
This paper addresses Gunningham and Grabosky’s assumption, and governments’ 
expectation, that private-sector involvement in regulatory enforcement results in more effective 
and efficient regulatory policy. The paper starts with a brief discussion of private-sector 
involvement in regulatory governance. It finds that a wide range of regulatory regimes have 
originated and been described, which can be roughly categorized as: regimes with more 
governmental than non-governmental involvement; and, regimes with more non-governmental 
than governmental involvement. The question here is: how does the “amount” of private-sector 
involvement in a regime affect regulatory policy? Subsequently, an empirical analysis of private-
sector involvement in the enforcement of Australian and Canadian building codes is presented. 
Here private-sector involvement was introduced as an addition to traditional governmental 
public regimes. Interestingly, the “amount” of private-sector involvement varies between the 
Australian and Canadian jurisdictions. In Australia and Canada eight different regimes have been 
identified, all of which aim at fulfilling a single task: guaranteeing the quality of the built 
environment. The main difference between the regimes is the extent to which this task has been 
privatized. The main difference between the countries is the relationship that exists between 
public- and private-sector actors that carry out this task: a competitive relationship in Australia; 
a complementary relationship in Canada. As such the research provides a unique opportunity to 
analyze a variety of different approaches to a single task within a comparable regime 
environment. The analysis suggests that private-sector involvement has indeed resulted in more 
efficient and effective regulatory enforcement in the Australian and Canadian cases. However, a 
certain threshold appears to exist after which, at least for this particular policy sector, more 
private-sector involvement does not result in more effectiveness or efficiency gains. After this 
point more private-sector involvement appears to result mainly in unintended impacts, 
especially related to accountability. Furthermore, the relationship between the public and 
private sector is found to impact upon social equity: different groups of regulatees experience a 
different level of service delivery. The research suggests that a complementary relationship is 
desirable over a competitive relationship between the public and private sector, when the same 
task can be carried out by both sectors. It has to be noted that the lessons drawn in this paper 
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have by no means theory status. However, private-sector involvement in Australian and 
Canadian building regulatory enforcement illustrates many of the impacts that might occur from 
low levels and high levels of private-sector involvement, and different relationships between the 
public and private sectors. 
 
 
2 Regulatory theories and approaches 
It is generally understood that, in order to make regulation work, it has to be enforced. 
Regulation and enforcement as a “means for achieving regulatory goals” can be referred to as a 
“regulatory regime”. When comparing a variety of works that address regulatory regimes it 
becomes clear that authors tend to focus on a structure of interrelated actors. For instance, 
Gunningham and Grabosky (1998: chapter 3) make a distinction between parties, their roles and 
their interactions; May (2007: 9) mentions an institutional structure, assignment of 
responsibilities, standards to measure compliance, and sanctions; and Longo (2008: 194) 
distinguishes structures, processes, players and their interrelationships, rules, control, 
enforcement and accountability mechanisms, and incentives. 
The elements used by these authors relate to the different elements of the “classic” 
enforcement pyramids: enforcement strategies and enforcement styles (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992: chapter 4), and enforcement actors (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998: chapter 6). By 
comparing these works a structure of regulatory regimes becomes clear: regulations are drawn 
up to express policy goals; enforcement is introduced to monitor regulatees’ compliance with 
these regulations; and oversight is introduced to monitor enforcement by enforcement actors. 
Note that enforcement itself is often enforced as well; to avoid confusion in terminology, the 
enforcing of enforcement is here referred to as “oversight” (for an overview of literature on 
oversight, see Marvel and Marvel 2007). 
For a long time regulation, oversight and enforcement were considered governmental 
tasks and responsibilities. Regulatory regimes were organized as “pure public” structures in 
which all tasks and responsibilities came to governmental agencies (Baldwin and Cave 1999). 
Yet, from the 1970s onward these pure public regimes were criticized for being ineffective and 
inefficient (Sparrow 2000). In response to such critique new forms for organizing these tasks 
were introduced. The phrase “from government to governance” (Rhodes 1997, 2007) is 
illustrative here: governing was no longer synonymous with pure public command-and-control 
regimes, but became associated with steering society in new ways. A new paradigm emerged 
stating the advantages of entrepreneurial government and the introduction of the private-
sector in former pure public regulatory regimes (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Gunningham and 
Grabosky’s Smart Regulation (1998) provides an excellent example. Their work addresses 
regulatory regimes in which tasks and responsibilities are taken up by public-sector sector 
agencies, private-sector agencies, or a combination of these.  
Involving the private-sector in regulatory governance has consequences. Governments 
often seek gains in effectiveness and efficiency. Note that these are highly contested terms. The 
central problems are: what constitutes effectiveness and efficiency; what should be measured; 
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and, against which standards should the unit of analysis be evaluated (Hodge 2000: chapter 4, 
Lee and Whitford 2009)? In the following empirical research, I keep close to the terminology as 
used by Gunningham and Grabosky (1998: 26-31). Effectiveness is defined as the degree to 
which building regulations are complied with. Efficiency is understood as the resources needed 
to gain compliance with regulations. The unit of analysis is the new regulatory regime, which will 
be assessed across time by comparing the new situation with the old “pure public” situation; 
and across space by mutually comparing the new regimes. Effectiveness and efficiency will be 
measured through the use of elite perceptions (cf. Lee and Whitford 2009). Following on from 
existing literature, private-sector involvement is expected to increase compliance with 
regulations, against the same or lower costs (cf. Baldwin and Cave 1999: 126). However, 
bringing in the private-sector might result in unintended impacts, such as a decline of social 
equity (cf. Lefeber and Vietorisz 2007), credibility (cf. Baldwin and Cave 1999: 130) or 
accountability (cf. May 2007). Trade-offs between various policy impacts might occur. The 
challenge for governments is to balance the different impacts; to compensate the disadvantages 
with advantages of private-sector involvement (cf. Stone 2002: 62). 
Interestingly, no ready-made solution is chosen when changing regulatory regimes. A 
broad variety of new regimes can be found in countries across the world. These are often 
characterized by an arrangement of tasks and responsibilities amongst both public- and private-
sector parties. Following this introduction of private-sector involvement in regulatory 
governance, regulatory scholars have introduced a wide range of regimes to describe and 
analyze these “mixed” situations. A distinguishing characteristic of these regimes is the quantity 
of tasks and responsibilities assigned to private-sector actors; the “amount” of private-sector 
involvement (cf. Van der Heijden and De Jong 2009). A second distinguishing characteristic is 
that private-sector involvement either replaces public-sector involvement, or is added to it as an 
alternative layer (cf. Mahoney and Thelen 2010). When added to an existing regime, a 
relationship might arise between the various regulatory actors, such as: “competing”, 
“complementing”, “supporting” or “merging” (cf. Barnard 1938: 101-103; illustrative examples 
can be found in Wilson 1989: chapter 19). 
Two major questions now arise: how does the amount of private-sector involvement in 
a regime affect regulatory policy? And, how does the relationship between public- and private-
sector actors affect regulatory policy? These are the central questions of the empirical analysis, 
which reviews private-sector involvement in Australian and Canadian building regulatory 
enforcement. 
 
 
3 A variety of regulatory regimes 
This section provides a review of private-sector involvement in Canadian and Australian building 
regulatory enforcement. In total eight different regimes are reviewed. Cases in Australia and 
Canada were selected for their long experience with private sector involvement in building 
regulatory enforcement – since the 1990s in Australia, since the 1980s in Canada. The second 
reason to choose these cases is variance in the “amount of privatization” – the tasks private 
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sector agents are allowed to undertake differ amongst the cases. A third reason for case 
selection is the similarity of Australian and Canadian political and judicial systems (Jackson and 
Jackson 2003) and building regulation (ABCB 2004, CCBFC 2005) – this all adds to the 
comparability of the case findings (see also, Van der Heijden 2005: pp. 87-94). Existing 
information was gathered from different (governmental) inquiries, organization websites, 
journals and newspapers. New information was gathered through a series of elite-interviews 
with over 100 representatives of the Canadian and Australian building industries and building 
control industries, and a follow-up survey. Five regimes are in Australia: the States of South 
Australia, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, and the Australian Capital Territory. 
Three are in Canada: the City of Vancouver, and the Provinces of Alberta and Ontario. Note that 
the City of Vancouver has a population of 2.3 million, which is twice as much as the population 
of all of Alberta’s metropolitan areas. 
 
The new regimes: four approaches to one task 
The regulation of safety, health, and amenity of people in buildings are deemed the 
responsibility of the provinces and territories in Canada (Hansen 1985) and the states and 
territories in Australia (ABCB 2002). In both countries the national government has 
nevertheless drawn up (comparable) advisory National Building Codes. Currently all 
provinces, states and territories have implemented these National Codes. Responsibility for 
enforcement of the Building Codes lies with the Canadian provincial, and Australian state 
and territory governments. Traditionally, most of these governments have passed on many 
of their building regulatory powers to their municipal Councils (Hansen 1985, Lovegrove 
1991). This resulted in a situation in which land use, planning, development and building 
regulations were enforced by local municipal building control departments (BCD) only: 
“pure public” regulatory regimes. 
Typical sub-tasks in building regulatory enforcement are building plan assessment and 
assessment of construction work on-site. Building plan assessment is carried out to check if 
proposed construction work complies with building regulations. This assessment might result in 
the issuance of a building permit. On-site construction work assessment is carried out to check if 
construction work is carried out according to the building regulations and the issued building 
permit. Upon completion of a building, often, an occupancy permit is issued after a final 
assessment. Specific enforcement sub-tasks are follow-up enforcement when on-site 
assessment of construction work reveals violation of regulations. This might imply sending a 
letter to a violator, requesting the violator to end the violation, or starting legal proceedings 
against offenders. 
In response to issues arising from municipal-led regulatory enforcement, governments 
in Canada have reformed their regimes of building regulation and control since the 1980s, and in 
Australia since the 1990s. This is in-line with the previously discussed literature. As a result, the 
private-sector has been introduced as an addition to local government building control. Under 
the new regimes, private-sector inspectors (PSI) can be involved in regulatory enforcement. 
However, the private-sector has been introduced with variances amongst jurisdictions. The main 
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difference is the amount of private-sector involvement, which for analytical purposes is 
distinguished as “low level private-sector involvement” and “high level private-sector 
involvement”. The former relates to regimes in which only assessment tasks can be taken up by 
PSIs, the latter relates to regimes in which assessment tasks and other tasks, the issuing of 
permits and/or follow-up enforcement, can be taken up by PSIs.  
 The main difference between the countries is the relationship between the public and 
private sector within the regimes. In Australia a competitive relationship is in place (PC 2004). 
Under the new regimes, regulatees have a choice to involve either public- or private-sector 
actors in their construction projects. In practice this means that the municipal BCDs and PSIs 
have to compete for clientele. In the Canadian regimes analyzed, a complementary relationship 
is chosen. Here municipalities can choose to be involved in regulatory enforcement, either fully 
or partly, or not to be involved in regulatory enforcement. Private-sector involvement is only 
possible where the municipalities do not take up regulatory enforcement tasks (BRRAG 2000; 
OHCS 2007). Note that competition amongst PSIs exists in both Canada and Australia. 
 Combining the amount of private-sector involvement and the relationship between the 
public and private sector results in four approaches towards one task: (1) low level and (2) high 
level private-sector involvement in a competitive relationship with the public-sector; and (3) low 
level and (4) high level private-sector involvement in a complementary relationship with the 
public-sector. In figure 1 the regimes have been classified according to these distinctions. 
 
 
  Relationship public/private 
  Competitive Complementary 
Amount of 
private-sector 
involvement 
Low level 
 
South Australia 
Australian Capital Territory 
Vancouver 
Ontario 
High level New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
Alberta 
 
Figure 1 – Distinguishing characteristics of the eight regimes analyzed 
 
 
4 Experiences with private-sector involvement in Canadian and Australian built 
environment policy 
Fully in-line with the previously discussed literature, both in Australia and Canada, private-sector 
involvement was introduced aiming to increase the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement, in 
terms of compliance with building regulations, and to increase the efficiency of regulatory 
enforcement, in terms of cost and speed. These are referred to as intended impacts. As 
expected from prior research, unintended impacts occurred as well. In this section, intended 
impacts will be discussed first, followed by the unintended impacts. 
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Intended impacts 
With the exception of Ontario, where municipal officials effectively lobbied against the 
implementation of private-sector involvement [1], in all cases a majority of interviewees’ 
accounts and survey questionnaire responses indicate a perceived gain in regulatory 
effectiveness due to private-sector involvement. However, these claims could not be verified by, 
for example, information on a decline of construction-related incidents. Where then does this 
perceived gain in regulatory effectiveness come from? Case data discusses the advantages of 
PSIs’ ability to specialize (cf. EI 2002: 40). A PSI based in Victoria explained: 
 
[Compliance has improved] I think for the simple reason that you get the most 
appropriate building surveyor for the project with the private system; the private 
system shows the best compliance. That’s not to say that the Council guys aren’t good 
enough. If someone would say to me: “Hey, check a house”, I’d probably struggle; and if 
they would say to me: “Hey, check a hospital” I wouldn’t have a problem. And if we [the 
PSI and the Council employee] swap around, it [would] probably be the same thing. 
 
In Vancouver BCD officials even advise clients to involve private-sector agents in complex 
construction work (CPP 2003). This occurs because the BCD lacks specialist expertise to assess 
complex construction work. Prior research, discussed in the previous section, finds that greater 
inspectorial depth is gained due to such specialist knowledge (cf. Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 
104, Baldwin and Cave 1999: 126). Greater inspectorial depth might result in finding more 
deviances, which then can be solved. As a New South Wales architect explained:  
 
Some of the [PSIs] do it better, because they are more qualified and better specialized. 
They would deal in specialized areas, whereas Council has to deal with everything; so 
Council officers come across stuff that they don’t know about. 
 
Here it should be noted that municipal BCDs often have a limited number of staff, but have to 
be able to deal with all assessment work provided. This means that BCDs often employ staff that 
has general knowledge instead of specialist knowledge. 
Interviewees indicated that assessment tasks, in particular building plan assessment and 
construction work assessment, influence effectiveness gains. These are the tasks that were 
regarded as providing private-sector agents the possibility to specialize. Case findings suggest 
that it is the combination of building plan assessment and on-site construction work assessment 
that results in most effectiveness gains. Knowledge gained in the first phase can then be applied 
in the latter phase. In South Australia, for example, private-sector involvement was experienced 
as “a cog in a large governmental machine”, since PSIs are only allowed to be involved in 
building plan assessment. Information is lost when a BCD takes over in a later phase of the 
enforcement process. 
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Other tasks in the enforcement process do not seem to add to effectiveness gains. 
Permit issuance was regarded a general administrative task; and follow-up enforcement, such as 
issuing warning letters, or instituting proceedings against offenders, was regarded a legal task. 
Both these administrative tasks and legal tasks are not related to the particular skills of PSIs. 
Even more, follow-up enforcement by PSIs might be counterproductive, as the Queensland case 
teaches.  
In Queensland a PSI who finds a violation of regulations has to take follow-up 
enforcement. This might, eventually, imply bringing the offender, who is often the PSI’s client, to 
court. Yet, a PSI who takes this measure has to pay for the trial. As different interviewees 
explained, to avoid ending up in expensive lawsuits PSIs make provisions in contracts to avoid 
legal issues by making it possible to end the contracts. If a contract is ended, the client has to 
search for a new PSI or turn to the BCD having jurisdiction. Finding another PSI is hindered since 
others know that “something is wrong” when a client moves to another PSI halfway through a 
project. The obvious choice is to turn to the local BCD, which is then handed a difficult case, and 
often has difficulty in obtaining or understanding assessment documentation from the initial PSI. 
 Closely related to these effectiveness gains are efficiency gains. In all cases, again with 
the exception of Ontario, case data indicates a perceived gain of efficiency as a result of private-
sector involvement in the new regimes. Private-sector involvement was mentioned to have 
made the assessment and permit process more streamlined and to have resulted in time savings 
for applicants (cf. KPMG 2002: 3-4, PC 2004: 221). This underlines the findings discussed in the 
previous section. Again here case findings suggest that the PSIs’ ability to specialize has a 
positive impact on efficiency: more knowledge of and experience with a certain construction 
type may result in a speedier assessment process since the PSI knows “where to look and what 
to look for”, as some interviewees indicated. A Vancouver-based engineer said: 
 
It might be more a “following rules for the sake of rules” attitude for some [BCD 
officials]. [PSIs] might have a more broad view and a better understanding of the 
important issues in the process. 
 
Differences in incentives and administrative procedures were also mentioned as reasons why 
PSIs could provide a speedier and less expensive service. A PSI might be willing to speed up a 
process when it results in more income, whereas a municipal BCD charges regulated fees and 
pays out its staff a regulated salary. Furthermore, PSIs might face less time delays in 
administrative procedures or channels. In short, as a Queensland state official mentioned: 
 
[PSIs] just provide a better seamless service. They are more client focused, and I hate 
the term, but they are more of a one-shop-stop. (…) In essence that’s what it is. 
 
As with effectiveness, the amount of private-sector involvement appears related to the impact 
of efficiency gains. Interviewees mentioned that efficiency gains could be lost due to 
overlapping tasks. Particularly the passing on of assessment documentation to municipal BCDs, 
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who then issue a permit, was regarded a loss of the advantages of private-sector involvement. 
The loss here relates to, at least, a doubling of administrative tasks. Following on from 
Leibenstein (1966), it may be argued that welfare maximization could be optimized if unique 
resources were used for unique goals. 
Here we thus find a potential tradeoff. The most efficient regimes appear to be those 
with a high level of private-sector involvement, little passing on of tasks, and little overlap of 
tasks. Maybe even those with no passing on and overlap of tasks at all – “pure private” regimes. 
At the same time the most effective regimes appear to be those which allow for private-sector 
involvement in all assessment tasks, but keep administrative and legal tasks with the 
government – regimes characterized by a low level of private-sector involvement.  
 
Unintended impacts 
Not only intended outcomes and gains were identified from private-sector involvement in the 
Australian and Canadian regimes. As expected, unintended impacts were traced as well. To start 
with, case findings suggest a decline of social equity, or “treating like cases alike” (cf. Stone 
2002: chapter 2), due to the competitive relationship between the public and private sectors in 
the Australian regimes.  
Case data suggests that in building regulatory enforcement a broad distinction can be 
made between two groups of regulatees: professionals in the building industry, such as 
developers, contractors, architects, and engineers; and non-professionals, ordinary citizens, 
frequently referred to as “moms-and-pops”. The former group is professionally and frequently 
involved in construction works and building regulatory enforcement; the latter group is more 
personally and occasionally involved. This broad distinction resembles Marc Galanter’s typology 
of regulatees in legal systems and his expressive terminology, which clearly points to the 
distinctive characteristics of the two groups, is also applicable to the respective groups: “repeat-
players” and “one-shotters” (Galanter 1974: 97). Subsequently, a broad distinction may be 
made between the type of work provided by these groups: the repeat-players are generally 
involved in major and often more complex construction works; the one-shotters are generally 
involved in minor and often less complex construction works. Major jobs are by and large more 
profitable to assess than minor jobs. Furthermore, Australian municipal BCDs face regulated 
fees under which the assessment of minor jobs is loss-making, whereas profitable fees for major 
jobs have to cover these losses. Besides, municipal BCDs are required to process all work 
supplied; whereas PSIs may choose whom to work with – a distinctive characteristic of the 
sectors (Wilson, 1989, 169).  
Case data indicates that the Australian PSIs “cream” the market for profitable jobs 
leaving less profitable jobs to municipal BCDs (see similar findings in Bailey 1988: 304). A South 
Australian state official said: 
 
What you quite often find is that 20 per cent [of assessment work that is dealt with by] 
the Council will normally be composed of the small works: house extensions, 
alterations, and small structures – those sorts of things. (…) The [PSIs] don’t want to 
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know [the small works], because they’re too messy and fiddly, and [they] would charge 
exorbitantly if you insisted them on doing [the small works]… They really don’t want the 
work. 
 
However, a South Australian PSI made clear: 
 
It is not that we don’t like to do [the small works]. We’re doing anything if there’s a 
dollar in it. But the way fees are based on area… If someone is doing a 50 square meter 
house addition and the [BCD] therefore has to do it for a hundred dollars; we just can’t 
do it for a hundred dollars. 
 
In itself, creaming does not appear to be a negative effect. As we have seen: PSIs specialize in 
certain types of construction work and supply specialized services, sometimes even for a lower 
price than their public counterparts do. This makes PSIs the obvious choice when planning to 
construct a certain type of work – both in Australia and Canada.  
However, the combination of competition between Australian PSIs and municipal BCDs, 
and the PSIs’ attitude to creaming the market, appears to have resulted in a decline of equity. 
Under the new regimes it appears that one-shotters face a lower level of service delivery than 
the repeat-players. The repeat-players, preferred by PSIs, appear to gain from private-sector 
involvement: the quality of service delivery appears no longer “available on the basis of need 
[but] limited to those who can pay” (Abramovitz 1986: 259). Notably, the introduction of 
competitive private-sector involvement is sometimes regarded as having improved BCDs’ 
service delivery: in order to be able to compete with private-sector actors, BCDs took over 
characteristics of the private-sector (which confirms other research findings, e.g. Price 2007: 
1149-1150). 
This particular situation was not found in the Canadian cases, presumably as a result of a 
different relationship between the public and private sectors. Under the new Vancouver regime, 
for example, the municipal BCD focuses on the less complex works, whilst PSIs are only allowed 
to assess complex construction works. By making this split it appears that the City of Vancouver 
has rightly estimated their own and the private-sector’s strengths. A former Chief Building 
Official of Vancouver said: “It’s not competition; it’s working side by side”. In the Albertan 
regime equity shortfalls appear forestalled by requiring PSIs to take all clientele. In Canada, it is 
not so much that the creaming attitude of PSIs has been averted, but creaming at the expense 
of municipal BCDs and one-shotters. 
On the side, one could argue that the equity shortfalls traced in Australia are not an 
equity issue per se, but an issue of willingness to pay. Yet, case findings suggest that this decline 
of equity may be strengthened. Now that choice exists between municipal BCDs and PSIs the 
repeat-players move to the private-sector – they show “exit” behavior (cf. Hirschman 1970). This 
leaves BCDs with assessing minor construction works where the clients are often one-shotters. 
BCDs face a decline of revenue and often resources when well-trained staff move over to the 
more profitable private-sector agencies which provide better terms of employment: 
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“municipalities have become the breeding grounds of cadets”, a South Australian BCD official 
mentioned. As a result BCDs might, in the future, be less able to deliver services at the required 
level. Under the current situation this appears to have led to a situation in which assessment is 
not equitably available to all regulatees; in the long term this situation may be strengthened 
when BCDs end up in a spiral of loosing revenue and resources. Furthermore, the one-shotters 
may have little possibility to challenge this situation since their possibilities to do so are limited. 
The repeat-players have a greater “voice”, but have no incentive to use it since they have moved 
to the private-sector (cf. Hirschman 1970: 45-46). 
The case of Alberta provides an illustrative example of a lack of “exit” possibilities, in 
which not so much the clients, the regulatees, but the provincial government has lost its “exit”. 
When the regime was introduced, it was expected that a large number of small PSI agencies, 
one- or two-person offices, would be set up, scattered around the province. It turned out that, 
due to competition, a small number of large agencies “survived” by buying out the smaller 
agencies. With only a small number of agencies in the field the provincial government faces 
difficulties to “steer” these agencies’ behavior. The strongest measure the provincial 
government can take is withdrawal of their license, which in practice means that the PSI agency 
has to quit working. However, taking a PSI agency out of the regime would imply that building 
regulatory enforcement would no longer be carried out in parts of the province. A provincial 
official wondered: “What would we do if [the PSI agencies] close their doors?”  
Furthermore, as a Queensland-based architect explained, too much privatization might 
result in a loss of information from the field back into the policy-making process. The “voice” of 
municipalities weakens. She explained: 
 
Local government used to have a large role in the input of regulations. This was based 
on experiences in the field. Now the loopback from Council to State or Federal 
government has been lost. 
 
Another unintended impact of private-sector involvement in the new Canadian and Australian 
regimes that is frequently mentioned can be summed up under the term “accountability issues”. 
Again this stresses findings from the literature discussed earlier. In general, interviewees 
expressed their concerns over PSIs being paid by their clients for carrying out building regulatory 
enforcement tasks. Questions were raised on the integrity of PSIs when a choice has to be made 
between their own private interest and guarding the public interest. Here the main difference 
described in the literature between the public and private sectors (e.g. Wilson 1989: chapter 17) 
manifests itself most clearly: the sectors have different goals – and interviewees experienced 
this as such.  
The issuing of permits especially was regarded as a task that might give rise to 
conflicting interests. The building permit is, often, needed before construction work can start. 
The occupancy permit is needed before a building can be occupied. Permits therefore can be 
seen as highly valuable, and obtaining that permit might be reason for clients to put pressure on 
the PSI. A Queensland-based PSI explained: 
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There’s a lot of pressure on the [PSI] to circumvent the system, to speed up the process. 
(…) The developer and the engineer and the architect have had [years] to go over all the 
design and redesign that they’re familiar with. And a week before construction is 
supposed to start on site, they lob eight inches of plans and paperwork on your desk 
and say: “We need this next week.” (…) And if you find any faults in the design at that 
late state of the process, you are the worst bastard under the sun. You cost ‘em their 
money, you cost ‘em their time. [Imitating a bossy developer:] “Who do you think you 
are? We don’t even need you in this process. We’ve got these top architects; they know 
what they’re doing. And you are just this lowly building inspector. And I wouldn’t even 
come to you if it wasn’t necessary. So what are you going to do for me? I’m paying you 
good money to do this and I need my plans approved by then”. 
 
In Ontario this provided grounds for the Ontario Building Officials Association to lobby 
successfully against the implementation of private-sector involvement (cf. Hemson Consulting 
2008). A representative of this association stated:  
 
We were concerned an independent builder could have someone working for him, he’s 
paying him, they review his plans, and bring them in rolled up and we have to issue a 
permit without opening them up. We were concerned that that’s the fox looking after 
the henhouse scenario. 
 
No information was available on violations by PSIs. Yet, notably, many PSIs interviewed 
mentioned that although they had never crossed the line, they all knew that others did. As an 
Alberta PSI put it: “A handful makes us all look bad and drag us all down”, and a South Australian 
state official explained: 
 
To [PSIs] it’s an issue of competition; being on a level playing field. (…) From the way 
they see it, there are some [PSIs] that are cutting too many corners. Doing things they 
don’t think are correct. (…) They have actually lost clients, they have lost people to 
another certifier who… is a bit more generous or a bit more lax in the way they [carry 
out assessments]. 
 
In order to monitor the situation, an additional level of oversight was introduced in all regimes – 
this approach was earlier referred to as enforcement of enforcement. However, this oversight 
was criticized by a majority of interviewees (cf. PC 2004: 207-208, NSW Government 2007: 96-
97, 103). Making and holding PSIs accountable for carrying out delegated tasks was one of the 
most serious obstacles interviewees mentioned (cf. Mulgan 2000). Generally this related to two 
issues. First, the oversight models, auditing in general, were experienced to focus too much on 
PSIs’ enforcement processes instead of the content of their work. This finding strengthens 
research by Power who notices that audits have become “rituals of verification” which provide 
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“comfort” instead of “proof” (1999: 38) that work is carried out according to and in alignment 
with delegated tasks. A statement by a Queensland BCD official is exemplary here: 
 
The auditing is a joke! One of the problems is that is easy to nail somebody for 
something that is easy [to find]. It is hard to know if someone has done something 
wrong when it is hard to find what is wrong. (…) [The auditors] come up and say: “Oh, 
look he didn’t sign that form, we’ve got him!”, or “He didn’t lodge on a certain day, 
we’ve got him!”, or “He didn’t do this or that…”. I look at this plan that doesn’t comply 
and have someone to technically check it. But that never happens. (…) They don’t tackle 
the hard things. 
 
Second, the lack of consequences from such auditing was generally regarded as bringing in too 
little awareness. In the Australian regimes, criticism was expressed towards the penalties issued 
as being too low and often coming too late; in the Albertan regime we have already seen that 
disciplinary actions cannot be, or are hardly ever, taken.  These findings underline that an 
essential part of the accountability relationship is the possibility and use of disciplinary action 
(cf. Mulgan 2000: 555-556).  
 Furthermore, a specific situation occurs in the regimes in which municipal BCDs have to 
issue permits based on PSIs’ assessment reports – South Australia, the Australian Capital 
Territory, Ontario and Vancouver. Liability issues may occur due to overlapping tasks. In general, 
liability law was regarded as an incentive that was needed to maintain the PSIs’ integrity (cf. 
Faure and Hartlief 1998: 705). However, overlapping tasks might blur who is liable for what: “the 
problem of many hands” (Thompson 1980). At question is: to what extent is the BCD responsible 
when a permit is issued based on a faulty PSI’s assessment? Especially under the model of joint 
and several liability, Canadian municipalities face severe liability risks and are regarded as “the 
deep pocket” (cf. Cerminara 1995: 17). To date, interviewees made clear, this question has not 
been fully answered – either in Australia or in Canada. 
 Finally, in all cases, as expected from the earlier literature review, the credibility of the 
public and private sectors was criticized. Case data indicates that credibility is interpreted 
differently by different interviewees and in different inquiries. However, especially in the 
Australian regimes it was explicitly stated in a number of interviews that ordinary citizens, the 
one-shotters, have more trust in municipal BCDs than in PSIs: “there’s a perception amongst the 
public that the government always does things better. Because of the independence”, an 
Australian Capital Territory PSI stated. At the same time, however, professionals in the building 
industry, the repeat-players, appear to have more trust in PSIs than their municipal 
counterparts: interviewees in all Australian cases indicate that 60–80% of all assessments, which 
roughly means all complex construction work, are carried out by PSIs (cf. EI 2002: 26, VCEC 
2005: 82, NSW Government 2007: 115;). 
This different perception of credibility might be related to exactly the plural meaning of 
the concept itself. Sometimes it is argued that credibility consists of “trustworthiness” and 
“expertise” (e.g. DeZoord et al. 2003, Nesler et al. 2006). In the Australian regimes it may be that 
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one-shotters value the trustworthiness of municipal BCDs, while at the same time repeat-
players value the expertise of PSIs. The creaming attitude of PSIs here may strengthen the 
ordinary citizens’ distrust of PSIs, whilst the “stigma”, built up in the past, of municipal BCDs 
being cumbersome and having an almost dictatorial attitude may strengthen the professionals’ 
distrust in these departments. This reasoning can also be applied in the case of Vancouver, 
where the credibility of PSIs was found to be a minor issue. Here the restricted choice between 
public- and private-sector involvement, the absence of competition, in building regulatory 
enforcement appears to be an answer to the different groups’ needs. 
 
 
5 Lessons to be learnt 
There is a notion to be made, before drawing lessons from the previous section. The analysis is 
based on secondary and interview data. Both datasets are inherently qualitative. The strength of 
such datasets is their ability to provide answers to the “how” questions posed in section 2 (see a 
variety of discussions in Brady and Collier 2004). No quantitative data was available to cross-
check the validity of these datasets, or to answer “how much” or “how often” questions.  
As we have seen, in Australia and Canada private-sector involvement was experienced 
and found to have resulted in effectiveness and efficiency gains due to PSIs’ ability to specialize. 
These findings underline conclusions, as discussed before, in other policy areas that private-
sector involvement has a positive impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of a regulatory 
regime. However, interviewees’ accounts also showed negative impacts as a result of private-
sector involvement. Integrity issues were mentioned as a result of conflicting interests; 
accountability issues as a result of oversight deficits; and liability issues as a result of overlapping 
tasks. Like the positive impacts, these negative impacts are found to result from private-sector 
involvement in other policy areas as well, see the earlier discussion. As well as stressing findings 
in the literature cited, a number of specific conclusions might be drawn from the analysis 
presented. 
 
Threshold 
This analysis stresses that the strength of enforcement actors comes from their professionalism 
and expertise (cf. Sparrow 2000, Braithwaite et al. 2007). Private-sector enforcement actors 
here were found to have strengths, skills, that public-sector enforcement actors lacked – and 
vice versa.  This was most clearly found in the “low level” private-sector involvement regimes. 
Other tasks in the enforcement process, issuing of permits and follow-up enforcement, might be 
considered tasks which do not benefit from PSIs’ specialist knowledge and expertise. As such, 
privatizing these tasks does not add to regulatory effectiveness.  
Even more, it could be argued that a task such as permit issuance strengthens the 
negative impacts reported upon. A permit allows the owner to start construction work, or to 
occupy a finished building. As such a permit is a highly valuable document in the building 
process. This high value might put pressure on a PSI not to “bite the hand that feeds”. In short, a 
certain “threshold” appears to exist after which more private-sector involvement does not result 
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in more regulatory effectiveness and efficiency. Even more, after this point more private-sector 
involvement appears to strengthen unintended impacts, such as accountability issues. This 
threshold may provide a valuable addition to the oft-cited “enforcement pyramids” (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992: 35, Gunningham and Grabosky 1998: 398). 
 When reforming regulatory regimes, policy makers face a wide variety of possible 
arrangements of regulatory tasks and responsibilities amongst both public- and private-sector 
parties. Understanding that there is “no one best way of organizing” (Wilson 1989: 26), the 
threshold notion might narrow down the range of choice of arrangements that can be expected 
to result in more effective and effective regulatory policy. Conflicting interests or overlapping 
tasks might be indicators for a threshold. Further empirical analysis might provide insight into 
other mechanisms and factors that might determine when such a threshold is likely to be 
reached. In regulatory practice the threshold notion might provide a focal point (Schelling 1980 
[1960]: 57) to work towards when reforming regulatory regimes. 
 
Relationships matter 
The analysis once more stresses that private-sector involvement often does not replace a prior 
“pure public” regulatory regime, but is added to it as an additional layer (cf. Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010). As a result, a relationship might arise between public- and private-sector actors in 
the arrangement. As already illustrated, a variety of relationships is possible, which might result 
in different impacts. This analysis traced a competitive relationship in Australia and a 
complementary relationship in Canada. 
 Where the amount of privatization was found to impact mainly upon effectiveness, 
efficiency and accountability, these relationships were especially found to impact upon social 
equity. Competition in Australia appears to have resulted in a situation where PSIs cream the 
market at the expense of BCDs and their specific clientele: one-shotters. Given the presence of 
two distinct groups of regulatees in this specific policy area, the complementary relationship in 
Canada appears to have resulted in a situation where the needs of a group of regulatees meet 
the strengths of the respective sectors. Repeat-players find expertise and service in private-
sector enforcement, one-shotters find trustworthiness and guidance in public-sector 
involvement. At the same time, both groups of regulatees face the lowest cost in these 
respective sectors. 
With respect to this policy area, a complementary relationship appears preferable to a 
competitive relationship. This finding challenges traditional reasoning that competition is the 
best relationship when privatizing enforcement (Landes and Posner 1975). An expectation based 
on the assumption that competition rewards innovation – improving quality, keeping down 
costs – and thus becomes an incentive to do so (cf. Osborne and Gaebler 1992: 88-92). Based on 
the above analysis, this reasoning appears valid for competition amongst PSIs, but not for 
competition between municipal BCDs and PSIs. 
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Case-by-case analysis matters 
From the above discussion one would expect that the combination of “low level” private-sector 
involvement and a complementary relationship results in the most “successful” or, to stick to 
Gunningham and Grabosky’s terminology, “smart” approach when it comes to enforcing 
building regulations. However, although this “smart privatization” approach was chosen in 
Vancouver and Ontario, the former regime might be judged “successful” whereas the latter is 
not. Various reasons may underlie these differences, space limits prevent me exploring these in 
depth here. Most important seems to be the time of implementation, 1981 versus 2006; other 
policy measures taken when private-sector involvement was introduced; and other layers that 
were added to the existing regime (CPP 2003; Short 2005). This finding shows us, once more, 
that in order to understand regulatory policy and the impacts of various policy instruments, such 
as private-sector involvement, a case-by-case analysis is preferable to the broad brush of 
general labels (Wright and Head 2009: 193). Nevertheless, an intensive comparative analysis like 
the one presented here might provide reasons to rethink general theories or open up avenues 
less travelled – for instance, the discussed threshold notion and the impact of relationships 
amongst various regulatory actors. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper started by quoting Gunningham and Grabosky’s proposition that “recruiting a range 
of regulatory actors to implement complementary combinations of policy instruments (…) will 
produce more effective and efficient policy outcomes” (1998: 15). This proposition is tenable 
with respect to the cases analyzed.  
What this paper has added to our general knowledge on private-sector involvement in 
regulatory enforcement is that, at least with respect to built environment policy, a certain 
threshold appears to exist after which more private-sector involvement in a regulatory regime 
does not result in more effectiveness and efficiency gains. With respect to the cases analyzed, a 
low level of privatization appears preferable to a high level of privatization. We furthermore 
learned that different relationships between the public and private-sector affect regulatory 
policy. Here, again with respect to the cases analyzed, a complementary relationship appears 
preferable to a competitive relationship. 
Based on these findings I argue that Gunningham and Grabosky’s proposition can be 
narrowed down to:  
 
Recruiting a range of regulatory actors to implement complementary combinations of 
policy instruments only results in effective and efficient policy outcomes when the 
different regulatory actors are recruited because of their specialism, and when actors 
complement each other within the regulatory regime. 
 
The validity of this assumption is ultimately a matter for further empirical inquiry.  
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Notes 
[1] The possibility of private-sector involvement exists, but is hardly used. See discussion under 
“unintended impacts”. 
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